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Abstract Genetically modified organisms are a technology now used with
increasing frequency in agriculture. Genetically modified seeds have the special
characteristic of being living artefacts that can reproduce and spread; thus it is
difficult to control where they end up. In addition, genetically modified seeds may
also bring about uncertainties for environmental and human health. Where they will
go and what effect they will have is therefore very hard to predict: this creates a
puzzle for regulators. In this paper, I use the problem of contamination to com-
plicate my ascription of forward-looking moral responsibility to owners of geneti-
cally modified organisms. Indeed, how can owners act responsibly if they cannot
know that contamination has occurred? Also, because contamination creates new
and unintended ownership, it challenges the ascription of forward-looking moral
responsibility based on ownership. From a broader perspective, the question this
paper aims to answer is as follows: how can we ascribe forward-looking moral
responsibility when the effects of the technologies in question are difficult to know
or unknown? To solve this problem, I look at the epistemic conditions for moral
responsibility and connect them to the normative notion of the social experiment.
Indeed, examining conditions for morally responsible experimentation helps to
define a range of actions and to establish the related epistemic virtues that owners
should develop in order to act responsibly where genetically modified organisms are
concerned.
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Introduction
In ethics of technology and ethics of engineering, many scholars have asked how
and why to ascribe moral responsibility to agents in forward- and backward- looking
ways (see Vincent et al. 2011). However, new technologies bring new challenges to
the field of engineering ethics. In this paper, I consider the case of genetically
modified organism (GMO) contamination, which challenges the ascription of moral
responsibility to agents based on the condition of knowledge. Indeed, how can we
speak of the ascription of moral responsibility regarding a technology when its
effects are very difficult to know or simply unknown? In this paper, I hope to
contribute to the fields of engineering ethics and responsibility theory by exploring
this question through the problem of GMO contamination.
There has been much discussion about the contamination that results from the use
of GMOs in agriculture, which may create different types of harm. Firstly, there is
economic harm to farmers who might lose organic certification because of the
presence of GMOs in their fields; or, conversely, seed developers with certain rights
over these seeds might lose out on expected profits when ‘escaped’ or ‘duplicated’
seeds are used without their permission. Many legal costs are involved in sorting
these issues out. Secondly, there is environmental harm in the sense that agricultural
biodiversity (and even biodiversity more generally) may be affected by the presence
of new seeds or horizontal gene transfer in ways that are still unknown. Lastly, just
as the effects of GMO contamination on the environment are currently unknown,
unwanted and unknown GMOs in food may impact human health. This is highly
speculative, as there is no uncontested evidence that points to such effects.
However, past experiences with new technologies have shown that they should not
simply be, so to speak, innocent until proven guilty and that we should show some
precaution and humility when dealing with these new technologies (Stirling 2007).
ISAAA (2015) reports that, ‘‘in 2014, a record 181.5 million hectares of biotech
crops were grown globally—[…] more than 100-fold gain since 1.7 million hectares
were planted in 1996.’’ Their increasing popularity make the question of
responsibility ascription for technologies with unknown effects ever more
important.
In answering this question, I first introduce some state of the art considerations
with regard to knowledge and responsibility theory. I then present my proposal to
deal with the hazards of GMOs by ascribing forward-looking moral responsibility to
owners, and I explain how this proposal runs into problems when it comes to
contamination. By drawing from experiences in the field of nuclear energy, as well
as from the normative notion of social experimentation, I suggest practical
solutions. I then return to the original problem of knowledge and responsibility to
finalize my proposal about how owners are morally responsible for new
technologies when their effects are unknown.
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Knowledge, Ignorance and Responsibility
Scholars distinguish between forward- and backward-looking moral responsibility:
the latter as a way to establish moral responsibility after the fact and the former as
‘prospective’ way. Backward-looking moral responsibility can usually be ascribed
to an agent if the following conditions are fulfilled, at least to some extent: freedom
of action, foreseeability, wrongdoing, causality, and capacity (Doorn 2012; Nihle´n
Fahlquist et al. 2014). Freedom of action and capacity mean that an agent was not
coerced into performing an action and that this agent has the means to perform that
action. The three remaining conditions, foreseeability, wrongdoing, and causality,
are linked to having knowledge about an action a and its results. Foreseeability
implies the ability to anticipate things that will happen as a result of an action a.
Wrongdoing also implies that there is knowledge that an action a might go against
some norms. Causality means that after the fact, we are able to trace the causes of an
action a and link them to the consequences of that action.
If an agent possesses only limited knowledge about an action y, we encounter the
problem that foreseeability, wrong-doing, and causality become conditions that are
difficult to judge when we assess her backward-looking moral responsibility, e.g. a
farmer planting GMOs that are later found to be harmful. It would seem wrong to
argue that if there are indeed limits to these conditions, then there is no moral
responsibility on the part of the agent who has taken the action y.
These considerations are for backward-looking responsibility and knowledge, so
what about the forward-looking variety? Van de Poel (2011b) argues that for at least
two types of backward-looking moral responsibility, blameworthiness and account-
ability, there needs to be forward-looking moral responsibility ascription in the first
place because moral responsibility is a relational concept. This does not include duties,
as duties are specific actions for a specific individual and responsibilities are only
concerned with a desired state of affairs, regardless of the individual who achieves it.
The relational aspect of forward- and backward-looking moral responsibilities means
that you cannot deem an agent blameworthy or accountable for an action that she did
not have a forward-looking moral responsibility to perform before something went
wrong and made her blameworthy or accountable. Therefore, a lack of (or limits in)
knowledge will have an impact on the conditions for backward-looking moral
responsibility, but it does not remove moral responsibility from an agent altogether.
This is quite a strong statement, because it does not remove responsibility from
unknowing agents. Indeed, not knowing does not free someone from moral
responsibility if she had a forward-looking moral responsibility in the first place. In
terms of forward-looking responsibility, two types are identified in the literature:
responsibility-as-virtue and responsibility-as-obligation (see Vincent et al. 2011).
Although these distinctions can be challenged, this is not the purpose of my paper.
Rather, I mention them here because the remainder of this paper will focus on
responsibility-as-virtue. Van de Poel concludes his chapter on the link between
forward- and backward-looking moral responsibility with a thought I would like to
expand on. Hewrites, ‘‘Another direction in which the account can be extended is […]
by incorporating the role of responsibility-as-virtue’’ (2011b, p. 51). Responsibility-
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as-virtue is defined as an agent having ‘‘the disposition (character trait) to act
responsibly’’ (Van de Poel 2011b, p. 39). But what does having the disposition to act
responsibly mean? Also, is there only one character trait that renders an agent morally
responsible? This definition is very broad and therefore opens the door for exploring
the concept of responsibility-as-virtue in the context of engineering ethics.
Being morally responsible with a lack of complete knowledge is another way of
talking about culpable ignorance. Fitzpatrick’s work (2008) is prominent in the ethical
debate over whether there is culpable ignorance outside akrasia. The proponents of the
akratic condition argue that there is only culpable ignorance if it can be traced back to
an akratic action, i.e. if an agent, at some point, exhibited weakness of will. This thesis
is highly debated in the field of ethics (for the latest refutation, see Robichaud 2014).
Fitzpatrick opposes the akratic condition. He argues that this condition is too narrow,
because it means that people can only be held responsible if an episode of akrasia can
be identified at some point in the chain of action. Therefore, he brings in the notions of
circumstantial and normative ignorance. Circumstantial ignorance refers to factual
ignorance, or lack of knowledge, whereas normative ignorance refers to ignorance of
right and wrong. For Fitzpatrick, culpable ignorance implies the exercise of epistemic
vices. This will tie in nicely with the ideas developed above on moral responsibility-
as-virtue. He writes,
Culpable Ignorance: Ignorance, whether circumstantial or normative is
culpable if the agent could reasonably have been expected to take measures
that would have corrected or avoided it, given his or her capabilities and the
opportunities provided by the social context, but failed to do so either due to
akrasia or due to the culpable non-akratic exercise of such vices as over-
confidence, arrogance, dismissiveness, laziness, dogmatism, incuriosity, self-
indulgence, contempt, and so on. (2008, p. 609)
So culpable ignorance stems from epistemic vices. Therefore, in order to have
responsibility-as-virtue for problems involving a lack of knowledge, we can specify
responsibility-as-virtue as the responsibility to cultivate epistemic virtues in order to
avoid the epistemic vices described above, given that those virtues would be the
opposite of those vices. For our case, what is interesting in Fitzpatrick’s definition is
the importance of the social context, which makes his theory much more practical
for real-life contexts.
Keeping these insights about knowledge and responsibility-as-(epistemic)-virtue
in mind, let us now examine a proposal for ascribing forward-looking moral
responsibility in the case of genetically modified seeds and consider how these
insights can enhance that proposal.
Current Proposals to Ascribe Moral Responsibility for Contamination
of GMOs
In previous work (Robaey 2014), I have suggested ascribing forward-looking moral
responsibility to owners of a technology. This proposal was intended to address the
hazards of GMOs, given the high level of uncertainty and ignorance with regard to
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their potential harms. I argue that ‘‘the owner of a genetically modified seed has the
moral responsibility to do no harm with that seed and there can be several owners of
the said seed at the same time that will share moral responsibility for each seed that
has the modified character trait and is currently owned’’ (Robaey 2014, p. 53). In
other words, a genetically modified seed has several owners at the same time,
because each owner will have different sets (or ‘‘bundles’’) of economic rights over
that seed at the same time. With ownership rights, however, comes the duty to
prevent harm (Honore´ 1961). In my work, I make a number of distinctions. First, I
use Goodin’s distinction between duties and responsibilities (1986); both notions are
prescriptive, but they differ in that duties are a deontological notion, whereas
responsibilities are a consequentialist notion. A second useful distinction is the one
drawn among risks, uncertainties, and ignorance. Risks are known probabilities for
known events, whereas uncertainties are unknown probabilities for known events,
and ignorance involves wholly unanticipated factors (Felt et al. 2007). I argue that
duties are better suited to dealing with risks, since duties can be formulated as ‘‘an
agent X should do (or refrain from doing) a,’’ where a is a specific action. However,
it is very hard to define a in situations of uncertainty and ignorance—so an agent X
should do something, but that something is not specified and thus requires the agent
to have a degree of discretion in order to learn and improvise. Therefore, I argue that
it is more useful to speak of responsibilities as a consequentialist notion when
dealing with uncertainties and ignorance, i.e. ‘‘an agent X ought to see to it that u’’
where u is a desired state of affairs. I suggest transforming Honore´’s ‘duty to
prevent harm’ that comes with ownership into a ‘responsibility to do no harm.’ In
that sense, ascribing forward-looking moral responsibility both requires and allows
owners, i.e. agents who actively decide to use a given technology and have certain
rights over it, to monitor and use discretionary powers to bring about a desired state
of affairs u.
The proposal was developed in light of current debates about genetically
modified seeds in agriculture. Two main points of contention were identified: (1)
about ownership and (2) about risks associated with genetically modified seeds.
There was no discussion of moral responsibility for using this technology—thus the
proposal to ascribe forward-looking moral responsibility to owners in order to deal
with risks. Nevertheless, genetically modified seeds, like other new technologies,
pose new challenges. Seeds can self-replicate and spread, so genetically modified
seeds can do the same, propagating the modified trait. But saying that owners have
forward-looking moral responsibility does not actually solve the problem of
contamination.
The Problem of Contamination
The issue of contamination arises because GMOs are a living technology. The seeds
containing the modified gene can replicate and spread; the legal term for this is
adventitious presence (AP). Also, the modified genes can be transferred to other
plants of the same species or similar species that do not have the modified trait; this
is called horizontal gene transfer (HGT). In the realm of GMOs, both these
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phenomena are commonly known as contamination. I would like to draw an initial
distinction here. Recent studies have shown that the risks of HGT between plants
are actually very small, and that transfer is more likely to occur with bacteria (Keese
2008). So although HGT has been observed in certain cases (for instance see Beckie
et al. 2011), it raises worries only for unmanaged fields (Simard et al. 2002). Since
HGT is so rare, we will leave it aside in this paper. Rather, we will focus our
analysis on AP, as it has been the source of many lawsuits (cf. Monsanto Canada v.
Schmeiser 2001 and OSGATA 2011) and the concern of much legislation, at least in
the European Union (EU).
It is interesting to note that AP is commonly referred to as contamination. It is
helpful to further investigate the meaning of contamination to understand how it has
shaped current regulations of deliberate release and co-existence in the EU (see
Regulation (EC) 1829/2003, Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 and special guidelines on
co-existence). The focus will be on the EU since it has the most extensive body of
regulation for the use of GMOs, which many countries either emulate or criticize for
being too strict. It is, however, important to note that the notion of contamination in
the food sector is a broad one that generally describes the unintentional presence of
undesired and potentially dangerous substances, usually chemicals, bacteria, toxins,
or metals, in food or feed. Contamination, which can occur during ‘‘production,
processing or transport’’ (EFSA 2015), is therefore a term connected to food safety.
In the case of GMOs, contamination refers to the spread of GMOs to other fields,
or to processed foods, which were not supposed to contain them. The European
Commission’s website for the Directorate General for Health and Consumers reads:
‘‘Conventional products, i.e. those produced without genetic modification, can be
contaminated unintentionally by GMOs during harvesting, storage, transport or
processing. However, conventional products ‘contaminated’ in this way will not be
subject to traceability or labelling requirements if they contain GMO traces below a
0.9 % threshold level, provided that the presence of genetically modified (GM)
material is adventitious or technically unavoidable. This is the case where farmers
can show the competent authorities that they have taken appropriate measures to
avoid the presence of GM material’’ (DG Health and Consumers).
But where GMOs and food safety are concerned, the use of the term
‘‘contamination’’ is ambiguous. First of all, not all GMOs are the same. The health
and/or environmental impacts potentially caused by a flood resistance gene, a
pesticide resistance gene, and a gene that codes for vitamin A are unknown, and will
most likely not be the same if they do exist. So the spread of GM seeds seems to
pose another type of contamination problem, not one necessarily related to food
safety. Rather, the spread of GM seeds threatens potential harm in the sense that
their presence in other fields, or in other plants, will change the genetic make-up of a
given field or plant. This could mean the loss of certain species, and thus loss in
biodiversity, or loss in conserving certain species as they were. In the agricultural
world, this can result in economic harm to farmers who do not wish to plant GMOs
and find their own fields and seeds taken over by unwanted plants. It can lead to the
loss of an organic certification, or simply to the loss of the farmer’s or seed
breeder’s work in developing a certain crop. This, in turn, can generate problems in
food security (rather than food safety) because it can lead to the loss of agricultural
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biodiversity; large monocultures are more susceptible to biotic shocks, which in the
current changing climate could decrease the resilience of agricultural systems
(Thrupp 2000, Timmermann and Robaey, forthcoming). Again, it is important to
note that all seeds can travel, and spread, and transfer genes, so these problems are
not restricted to GMOs. I address the problem via GMOs only because they are the
subject of public fear and inquiry.
So there is a problem with GMOs, and it is commonly called contamination.
This, as explained above, is a misleading term with regard to the effects of that
contamination—but perhaps not when it comes to describing the unintentional and
undesired spread of seeds, as well as the potentially harmful impacts of this spread.
In the European Union, the introduction of GMOs has stirred many fears and
controversies (Levidow and Carr 2007), and the notion of co-existence was
developed for farmers to be free to choose which kind of seeds they want to use.
Plainly put, co-existence suggests that GMO fields and non-GMO fields can exist
together, although adventitious presence is said to be technically unavoidable
(Levidow and Boschert 2008). Introducing this definition may have created more
problems than solutions. Levidow and Boschert argue that the concept of co-
existence has in fact given rise to a battle of contradictions between agrarian
paradigms (2008). So co-existence did not solve the problem of contamination, i.e.
the self-replication and spread of seeds. This boils down to problems of knowledge
and control. It is very difficult to predict where GMOs will go and how to trace them
(Cardarelli et al. 2005).
There is a growing feeling of injustice regarding how courts deal with disputes
over contamination. The case of Monsanto Canada against the Canadian farmer
Percy Schmeiser, which was described as one of David versus Goliath, ended in
victory for Monsanto. The case of OSGATA, an organic farmer coalition looking to
pre-emptively sue Monsanto to prevent them from suing them in case of
contamination, saw the same result.
The current system regulating GMOs therefore appears highly inefficient, in that
it not only does not deal with potential hazards in a constructive way, but also
creates new conflicts and apparent injustices. This puts GMOs, an application of
biotechnology with potentially enormous benefits for society, at risk. The problem
with contamination is also one of knowledge: who should know where these seeds
go, and how should they know?
Contamination and Ownership
Now that we better understand the nature of the problem of contamination and its
implications, let us return to our original problem, namely how the lack of
knowledge challenges the ascription of moral responsibility. As mentioned earlier,
ascribing forward-looking moral responsibility to owners does not actually solve the
problem of contamination. If anything, contamination challenges the very idea of
clearly-defined ownership. Indeed, due to the very nature of seeds, which can
disperse and self-replicate, the link between ownership and forward-looking moral
responsibility is challenged. How do we speak of moral responsibility for
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technologies that can literally be ‘gone with the wind’? This also problematizes
ownership because it would be nonsensical and counterproductive to expect owners
to control all forces of nature. So do they still bear forward-looking moral
responsibility for seeds that might have naturally spread and which they do not know
about? There is also the case of farmers who might be cultivating those seeds as a
result of contamination but also do not know of the seeds’ presence in their fields; in
a sense, they become de facto owners when they are using the seeds, but does this
grant them forward-looking moral responsibility? Another case is one where the
genetically modified seeds are in a no-man’s land; then under whose forward-
looking moral responsibility do they fall? These problems of ownership also imply
problems of ascription of forward-looking moral responsibility for the hazards
surrounding GMOs. One can either dismiss the role of ownership in ascribing moral
responsibility or strive to further develop this framework. I will do the latter.
If moral responsibility is broadly defined as ‘‘an agent X ought to see to it that
u,’’ where u is a certain state of affairs in which contamination does not occur as far
as reasonably possible, this is rendered difficult in situations of limited knowledge.
It is difficult:
1. for original owners to prevent what they do not and sometimes cannot know,
and
2. for de facto owners to further prevent what they also do not and perhaps cannot
know.
At this point, it is important to recall that ownership is conceived of as a bundle
of rights. In these cases, original owners have different bundles of rights depending
on their role and relation to the genetically modified seed. For instance, a farmer
may have purchased a seed and have a right to use and derive income from it, but
not a right to transfer or a right to possess it (i.e. exclude others from using it). But
the company selling the seed may very well have the right to possess it, the right to
transfer it, the right to derive income from it, and the right to use it. This is what
Honore´ calls split ownership, where different agents have different bundles of rights
over the same thing. So original owners may have different bundles of rights over
the same genetically modified seeds. The de facto owners present an interesting case
because they exercise a right to use without knowing that they do. They do not in
fact have the right to use, but they unknowingly act as if they did by cultivating a
field that might be contaminated. In the GMO case, de facto owners are by default
always farmers who did not intend to cultivate GMOs but were cultivating them,
like the Canadian farmer Percy Schmeiser.
As explained earlier, with the bundle of rights comes the responsibility to do no
harm, which like ownership is also ‘split’ (or shared, or joint). So if the
responsibility to do no harm involves preventing contamination, owners have a
problem if they don’t know about the contamination.
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Solutions to Contamination: What GMOs can Learn from Nuclear
Energy Technologies
GMOs have unique characteristics of self-replication and spread that are not found in
other technologies. However, the problems of (1) contamination, (2) shifting
ownership (with the de facto owners), and (3) lack of knowledge about effects are
not unique to GMOs. Indeed, nuclear energy technologies present similar challenges.
Contamination
First, nuclear energy technologies have extensively dealt with problems of
contamination because of the radioactive wastes they produce. The question of
how to deal with nuclear wastes raises several questions relating to safe
containment. Before I explain in detail how containment is done in nuclear energy
technology, I would like to remind the reader that containment seems to be the most
obvious answer to contamination; it is a way of controlling things that spread. This
is also why the EU GMO regulations speak of deliberate release and containment.
In the case of nuclear waste, the main concern is how to stop remaining radiations
from harming people. Nuclear radiations can spread and can cause harm. There are
different kinds of nuclear wastes that require different kinds of storage, but this paper
will consider only highly radiotoxic nuclear wastes. Amongst the solutions for dealing
with these highly radiotoxic wastes, the most realistic and most commonly used
method is deep underground disposal; geological repositories are believed to be the
safest locations because they combine engineered and natural barriers. Creating
multiple barriers for storage strongly reduces risks of leakage (see Taebi 2012).
While there are similarities to GMOs here, there are also differences. For
instance, GMOs do not require that anything similar to nuclear wastes be moved
around or stored. Also, in comparison to GMOs, nuclear radiations are generally
easier to trace because there will be one point of measurable radioactive emission
(unless they leak from the repository). GMOs are usually not easy to find, and tests
need to be run on several seeds to establish AP (or contamination). These
differences impact traceability, but methods of containment can still be imple-
mented. An interesting lesson from the case of nuclear waste is the idea of multi-
layered barriers. What kind of natural and engineered barriers could limit the spread
of GMOs? Greenhouses and buffer zones are the ones currently used—especially
when required by regulation, as in the European Union—but this is not universal.
Maybe the idea of multi-layered barriers can be further implemented at different
stages of GMO use in order to reduce the chances of contamination. Also, although
there is no waste to be moved, perhaps thinking more strategically about sites of
planting will prove helpful.
Shifting Ownership
Taebi (2012) speaks of inter- and intra-generational issues of justice with regard to
the multinational disposal of nuclear wastes. This approach allows one to choose the
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most apt storage site. Multinational repositories are more just from an inter-
generational perspective, because they permit access to the optimal geological
repositories, although it is unjust from an intra-generational perspective for one
country to take the nuclear wastes of another country. So as one generation makes
decisions about the management of these wastes, a future generation will have to
deal with these decisions. We can thus observe a shift in ownership of the nuclear
wastes.
This is also the problem we see in GMOs. The difference is that the shifting
ownership is a direct result of contamination, rather than being due to the longevity
of the material in question, as with nuclear wastes. Some of the legal cases
described at the beginning of this paper illustrate this shifting ownership. In the case
of nuclear wastes, there are institutions and agreements around the idea of
multinational waste disposal so that when ownership shifts, new owners have a
means of dealing with the wastes. In the case of GMOs, only blame seems to be
transferred with ownership; there is no constructive way to deal with them once
ownership has shifted.
There are clearly-defined institutions responsible for dealing with nuclear wastes.
Due to the different nature of GMOs, there is no such limited range of actors who
have clear role responsibilities. Where we would have one nuclear plant and one
waste disposal site, we have several farmers using GMOs in different places. This is
not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, Bergen (2015) comments on the need for
reversibility in institutional dealings with nuclear wastes. The lack of reversibility
might create technological lock-ins where undesirable solutions prevail. In the case
of GMOs, it is more the fluidity of technology, of institutions and of actors that
prevails. Institutions differ from country to country—and hazards are also perceived
differently from country to country, because they are less tangible than the past
catastrophes associated with nuclear energy. GMOs have no Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl, or Fukushima. This is a good thing. Having overly rigid institutions can
create situations that are hard to adapt to, or that make it difficult to change the
course of actions if agents find out these actions are wrong. With a more fluid
situation, agents can react appropriately without being bound within a system that
does not allow for unanticipated change. However, the question remains: if
contamination is still such a pressing issue for GMOs, who bears the forward-
looking moral responsibility for it, how is it shared, and what does it entail?
Practically, this raises the following questions: Where will seeds go? Who will use
or own them, intentionally or unintentionally? How will these actors deal with them
responsibly?
Lack of Knowledge About the Effects
The third point of comparison is with regard to the effects of GMOs and radiation
from nuclear wastes. There are many unknowns as to what will happen, and where
and when it will happen, with nuclear wastes thousands of years down the line.
Shrader-Frechette (1993) argues that the knowledge we have consists only of
predictions stretching over 10,000 years, and that it is not reliable. In the same way,
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there are many unknowns as to the long-term effects of certain GMOs on the
environment and on human health.
Pondering the case of nuclear energy brings us to a much-discussed notion: the
social experiment. This concept has had many meanings in the past, both normative
and policy-related. In the case of new technologies, it has had pejorative connotations.
After Chernobyl, Krohn and Weingart (1987) wrote about the nuclear social
experiment in a negative way. Indeed, society was experimenting, which also meant
makingmistakes at a scale where humans could be severely harmed. Similar analogies
have been made in the realm of biotechnology, referring to GMOs as Frankenfoods
(Van denBelt 2009) or as a ‘‘gigantic experiment’’ (BBC2008). Beck (1992) describes
new risks as unintentional, unseen, and compulsive; such risks create new societal
problems. In the recent literature, non-pejorative descriptions of GMOs as experi-
mental also appear, at least in terms of regulatory experiments (cf. Levidow and Carr
2007; Millo and Lezaun 2006). In the fields of ethics of risk and engineering ethics,
Van de Poel (2011a) takes a stance on the nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima by arguing
that we should experiment. Here, the notion of the social experiment is a normative
one. Indeed, we should experiment in society because then we have to follow certain
ethical conditions for responsible experimentation (Van de Poel 2011a). By
experimenting, agents have to fulfill both higher and instrumental values. For
instance, pursuing instrumental values such as learning and intervening will allow us
to fulfill higher values such as justice, autonomy, benevolence, and non-maleficence to
all members of society (Robaey and Simons 2015).
What is unusual about Van de Poel’s use of the term ‘‘social experiment’’ is that
it emphasizes the unknowns that remain when we use new technologies. Unlike
classical experiments, social experiments are not controlled and limited by one
experimenter. Many agents are experimenting, and many may not be aware that
they are experimenting. Being part of a social experiment gives rise to special
responsibilities to fulfill certain conditions or values. Van de Poel’s proposal draws
on literature in bioethics and environmental management. It does not define
responsibility per se, but rather defines the aims of responsible introduction of new
technologies into society: namely, minimizing negative and unwanted side effects to
make the best of technologies that can greatly improve our lives.
In the next section, I ask how this notion of a normative social experiment relates
to using ownership as a means of ascribing moral responsibility, and I explore the
idea that owners must develop epistemic virtues in order to be responsible.
Owners as Social Experimenters: Some Practical Recommendations
Owners are social experimenters because they are the ones who actively decide to
develop and/or use technologies, in this case GMOs. Who are the owners, and what
should an owner do as a social experimenter?
First of all, not all owners will have the same interaction with the seeds, so they
may have different means of pursuing the instrumental value of intervening. This
also applies to learning, as well as to the other higher values of responsible
experimentation. Indeed, those values will translate to different norms and
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requirements for different actors (Van de Poel 2013). It is this complementarity and
concerted action that will in the aggregate fulfill the goal of shared forward-looking
moral responsibility for achieving a desired state of affairs u, where contamination
does not occur (or its chances of happening are greatly reduced).
The fluidity of institutions mentioned in the previous section might appear
problematic; yet it can, under the right conditions, prove to be a very strong asset. If
they are to bear forward-looking moral responsibility, owners should have self-
supervisory and discretionary power, following Goodin’s consequentialist definition
of responsibility. Therefore, they are responsible for learning about the technology
they develop and use in order to be able to react to unexpected events. As explained
at the beginning of this paper, we choose to speak of responsibilities because duties
are too limiting in terms of the instrumental values of learning and intervening (to
use the language of the social experiment).
Also, if we formulate forward-looking moral responsibility as ‘‘an agent X ought
to see to it that u,’’ u takes on a new meaning in the social experiment. Under
uncertainty, u seems more likely to be achieved if the experiment is carried out
responsibly. In addition, lacking knowledge about the presence of seeds does not
absolve owners of their responsibilities but instead further defines these responsi-
bilities. Since owners can carry out the social experiment responsibly regardless of
the outcome and regardless of their lack of knowledge, the problem of
contamination no longer challenges the allocation of responsibilities according to
ownership. It is then a collective, or joint, imperative to act responsibly to limit or
avoid contamination.
To refine the notion of the social experiment, Van de Poel (2011a) suggests initial
conditions for responsible experimentation (see Table 1). As mentioned, these
conditions can be linked back to a set of instrumental and higher values. In a way,
these conditions refer to a range of actions that actors, or in this case owners, may
take in order to fulfill their forward-looking moral responsibility. In this paper, we
are concerned specifically with the problem of contamination and with the role of
owners—in other words, with how forward-looking moral responsibility works for a
technology that spreads in an unexpected way. Therefore, we will focus on asking
what the conditions of monitoring, scaling-up and flexible set up, and containment
of hazards as far as reasonably possible can mean as a range of actions for the
different types of owners involved. There are several other conditions presented by
Van de Poel that will not be elaborated on in this paper due to space constraints. In
the following paragraphs, I explore what these conditions imply for owners’ range
of actions. And I will later link these findings to owners’ epistemic virtues. It is
important to distinguish among the different types of owners in order to establish
what they can do, or what their capacities are.
Owners are not only the ones who decide to use a given technology, but also the
ones who have certain rights over it. Moreover, it is important to think about which
of these conditions apply to owners, as some (such as approval by democratically
legitimized bodies) are clearly meant for other social actors. Indeed, owners are not
the only experimenters. Citizens, governments, agencies, and NGOs all participate




If we consider scientists or bio-engineers to be the primary developers of GMOs,
for them the condition of monitoring could mean providing guidance about what to
monitor. Also, they could integrate markers that would make finding GMOs easier.
In the past, fluorescence genes have been suggested, but other ideas could be
developed as well. For the conditions of the set-up and the scaling-up, developers
are not in the field, so their range of actions is limited. Finally, with regard to
containment of hazards, developers can think in terms of design requirements—this
time not for the seeds themselves but for their management in the field.
In many ways, farmers have the same responsibilities as scientists. For instance,
they must provide local knowledge for identifying what to monitor and must
consider design requirements for using field management to contain hazards, which
goes hand-in-hand with the idea of the flexible set-up and scaling-up. Farmers have
first-hand knowledge and experience of their fields, and they should be given
discretionary power to set these up in the way they feel is safest. By learning from
factors such as wind patterns and migration habits of local species, they can
integrate new knowledge into the management of their fields. Their position at the
front line, so to speak, gives them increased burdens. However, there should be
support structures to prevent them from becoming over-burdened as they seek to
carry out their forward-looking moral responsibility.
If a farmer becomes an unintentional de facto user by harvesting seeds without
knowing that they are GMOs, it is a bit trickier to define her range of actions.
However, if these farmers are aware of the proximity of other seeds and aware that
they could become de facto owners, then they can support the GMO farmers in
providing information and constructing barriers. Coordination among different
actors will help to resolve the issue of contamination. The burdens of potential de
facto owners should not be greater than the ones of original owners. However, in the
current system, these de facto owners are unfairly over-burdened with backward-
Table 1 Possible conditions for socially responsible experimentation (Van de Poel 2011a)—emphasis
added to the conditions under study
1. Absence of other reasonable means for gaining knowledge about hazards
2. Monitoring
3. Possibility to stop the experiment
4. Consciously scaling up
5. Flexible set-up
6. Avoid experiments that undermine resilience of receiving ‘system’
7. Containment of hazards as far as reasonably possible
8. Reasonable to expect social benefits from the experiment
9. Experimental subjects are informed
10. Approved by democratically legitimized bodies
11. Experimental subjects can influence the set-up, carrying out and stopping of the experiment
12. Vulnerable experimental subjects are either not subject to the experiment or are additionally
protected
13. A fair distribution of potential hazards and benefits
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looking responsibility. Unfortunately, their cooperation is necessary to head off
contamination and to react to it quickly if it does occur.
This is where companies, universities, and research institutes who are promoting
and benefitting from the applications of GMOs have a special role. As institutions,
they are not necessarily ‘‘on the ground’’ as scientists and farmers can be, so their
role is a supportive one that involves facilitating and aiding proper implementation.
Currently, companies like Monsanto spend a lot of resources searching for their
seeds in others’ fields, as several lawsuits have demonstrated. They could spend the
same resources to help create multi-layered barriers, as we have learned from the
case of nuclear wastes.
I have mentioned design requirements for GMOs. One goal is to address
contamination, but this should not hinder achieving values of benevolence; in the
case of seeds, benevolence is about creating agricultural systems that are sustainable
and can feed the world. So design requirements should not produce more problems,
as with the concept of the Terminator gene (Van den Belt 2009). Companies,
universities and research institutes can play a role in providing a good (i.e.
benevolent) direction for the people who work for them in developing GM seeds.
Retailers and seed distributors have a different kind of role in that they help to
spread seeds. However, like the institutions mentioned above, they are not directly
in the field. Their role can instead be supportive. They can make sure that
purchasers of GM seeds, like farmers and consumers, are well aware of how to deal
with them in terms of limiting contamination. This might, for instance, involve
training and appropriate labelling.
These practical recommendations, derived from the concept of the social
experiment, are strengthened by the notion of forward-looking moral responsibility
as epistemic virtue. The next section shows exactly how.
Taking Responsibility Under Uncertainty
This paper began by posing the following question: if we cannot know of
contamination, how can we ascribe forward- and backward-looking responsibility
for it to owners? Now that we have seen in more practical detail what an owner can
do as a responsible experimenter, I would like to return to the notion of
responsibility as virtue. Indeed, the three conditions for morally responsible
experimentation that we translated into different ranges of action for each actor all
relate to the development of epistemic virtues, regardless of the type of owner
involved. Be it through new design requirements to enhance traceability, or be it
through new ways to learn about dispersion in order to better anticipate and limit it,
these actions are the result of developing epistemic virtues.
Earlier, we listed what FitzPatrick calls epistemic vices, but we did not go into
further detail once we established that virtues are the opposite of vices. Early
discussions of epistemic virtues were linked to belief formation and finding the
truth. While these are relevant questions, they are outside the scope of this paper,
which focuses on practical applications. For now, it is sufficient to mention what
Montmarquet (1987) identifies as possible epistemic virtues: impartiality,
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intellectual courage, and community. He also warns that epistemic virtues should be
regulated, because otherwise they might turn into dogma; hence the need for
community. In other words, an agent who develops and uses a new technology is
responsible for finding out more about it in a sound way and for sharing that
knowledge. To use the vocabulary of the social experiment, epistemic virtues allow
an owner to fulfill the instrumental values of learning and intervening—and thus
possibly other higher values.
Yet this might seem like a lot to demand of certain agents. In the previous
section, we distinguished among various roles. For instance, one can hope that
scientists who have the role of developers will possess epistemic virtue, given that
they work in the field of research. In this case, the key is to expand their scope of
inquiry, which we suggested via the notion of social experiments. Similar
considerations apply to actors who can be considered sponsors or spreaders; their
curiosity should not stop at the development and deployment of the product, but
should also apply to the use of the product, to see whether it actually helps to bring
about their goals. As for farmers, it seems that they are on the front line of the
experiment and can observe more. They might therefore bear greater burdens when
it comes to developing epistemic virtues. Epistemic demands might be too much for
certain agents to carry out, which would create a responsibility gap.
This is where Fitzpatrick’s definition is especially important. He writes that
ignorance is culpable if an agent fails to do what he or she could ‘‘given his or her
capabilities and the opportunities provided by the social context’’ (2008, p. 609).
Similarly, in the context of backward-looking moral responsibility, David Miller
proposes the capacity principle: ‘‘remedial responsibilities ought to be assigned
according to the capacity of each agent to discharge them. […] If we want bad
situations put right, we should give the responsibility to those who are best placed to
do the remedying’’ (2001, pp. 460–461). These distributive ideas are very clear from
the standpoint of backward-looking moral responsibility. Can we translate them to a
forward-looking allocation of responsibility? Of course being culpable for a wrong,
or being responsible for remedying a wrong, is not the same as having forward-
looking moral responsibility for something that didn’t happen. However, the
contexts and circumstances surrounding the use of GM seeds are not unknown. If
each actor’s range of actions and responsibilities as epistemic virtues are at the level
of that actor’s capacity to carry them out—in a manner that their epistemic virtues
will help them define—then they are able to take responsibility for the technology
they are developing or using. How owners’ responsibilities relate to each other is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is certainly a topic for future investigation.
Conclusion
GMOs promise improved agricultural yields in both quantity and quality. However,
their use has proven to be highly contested and problematic. In this paper, I examined
the proposal that we should allocate forward-lookingmoral responsibility to owners of
GMOs, as well as the limits of this proposal in the case of contamination.
Contamination highlights the problems stemming from limited or non-extant
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knowledge about the spread of GMOs, and therefore challenges the ascription of
moral responsibility. I established that incomplete knowledge does not remove
forward-looking moral responsibility from owners. GMOs are a technology that can
self-replicate and easily spread because of the nature of seeds. I focused on two
problematic cases: (1) the responsibility of original owners with regard to potential
contamination, and (2) the responsibility of de facto owners. Looking at nuclear
wastes led to two observations: (1) GMOs could benefit from multi-layered barriers,
and (2) the normative notion of the social experiment provides owners with a range of
actions. Through this reasoning, a range of action was defined for different types of
owners. This provides a solution to case (1), as the responsibility of owners to avoid
contamination is further defined by shared values relating to responsible experimen-
tation. Therefore, owners are responsible for developing epistemic virtues and
defining a range of actions to deal with potential problems, such as contamination.
Lack of knowledge does not pose a problem for the ascription of moral responsibility,
because owners are experimenters who should take responsibility.
This paper focused on forward-looking moral responsibility; this does not,
however, mean that backward-looking responsibility is not important. Indeed,
mechanisms of backward-lookingmoral responsibility can influence agents’ forward-
looking responsibility (cf. Van de Poel 2011b). In the case of GM seeds, several
lawsuits have transferred backward-looking responsibility to unintended owners. But
if conditions of forward-lookingmoral responsibility had been fulfilled by the original
owners, we would be left with cases that are straightforwardly morally wrong, such as
theft of seeds, rather than unintentional cases. This framework does not change the
rights of owners, but instead suggests forward-looking responsibilities that provide a
fair and efficient paradigm where stealing (rather than unintentional use) is punished.
Owners developing epistemic virtues and defining their range of actions will allow for
more responsible use of GMOs, despite incomplete knowledge. Seeds will then not
simply be gone with the wind, because owners will take responsibility and do
everything they can to avoid contamination.
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